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Standard definitions posit the sign as a discrete entity, in relation with other signs and 
standing for an object (either physical or psychological). Thus the sign has two roles, as 
prompt and as substitutive representation. The latter raises difficult questions about the 
relationship of the semiotic to the non-semiotic or pre-semiotic which can be resolved 
logically (as in Peirce) or rejected as unanswerable (as in Saussure) but which can never 
be satisfactorily resolved empirically as the phenomenal cannot be divorced from the 
semiotic. This impasse can be resolved if we drop the assumption that the sign is 
essentially substitutive. The assumption of discrete entities, at either the phenomenal or 
the noumenal levels, is a function of discredited substance metaphysics. On a process 
metaphysical account, the reality of the sign is not attached to the discreteness of any 
pre-existing entity. The sign remains as prompt and as relational but not (other than 
sometimes with respect to other signs) substitutive. Rather than defined as standing for 
an object, the sign can now be regarded much more simply as a feature of an event. This 




1. Introduction and rationale: the case for re-examining the fundamental nature of 
the sign 
The use and value of semiotics are in large part dependent on construals of the sign. 
Where semiotic approaches are grounded in an unqualified Cartesian mind-body dualism, 
semiotic activity tends to be construed as the activity of the human mind using symbolic 
systems as a gloss or commentary on an external reality that is not itself dependent on 
semiosis. This purely anthropocentric, implicitly dualist semiotics provides rich resources 
for the study of, for example, literary texts and the visual arts; indeed, the neat separation 
of the semiotic from the pre-semiotic may aid rather than abet semiotic analysis in such 
fields by failing to problematise widely held assumptions about the relationship of the 
arts to external reality. On this account, a sign (after Peirce as icon, index or symbol) 
stands in substitution of an object, whether physical or psychological. Semiotics thus 
construed is a purely applied discipline; the nature of the sign does not unsettle 
understanding of that which the sign represents. In some ways, this opens up possibilities 
for semiotics that, I shall argue, a more radical position excludes: for example, it might be 
possible to undertake a semiotic analysis of a science documentary without questioning 
the science that is presented. To many, perhaps most, non-semioticians, this might be 
highly desirable. At the same time, such an approach limits the potential scope of 
semiotics, particular in fields beyond the arts: in the social sciences or education, for 
example, where the role of interpretation may be downplayed in the construction of 
knowledge and reality (Stables, 2013), and even in fields such as physics, where 
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universal laws are brought into question, as in pansemiotic accounts of the later thought 
of Peirce.  
  
At least by 1907, Peirce would recognise that the end of semiosis of the highest 
kind is an intellectual habit, which realization may lead us to wonder whether the 
third basic element that is active in the universe, habit-taking, is a form of semiosis, 
and if that is what imparts the teleological current that Peirce finds in evolution. 
(Houser, in Peirce, 2000: lxxxiii-iv)   
 
Investigation of the nature of the semiotic therefore tends to raise more troubling 
concerns. In particular, forms of semiotics beyond the narrow anthroposemiotics 
described above pose fundamental questions about the extent to which the sign can 
validly be seen as standing for something else. Even in the burgeoning field of 
biosemiotics, where definitions of the latter abound, definitions of the sign remain tacit. 
(Brier, undated.i) A biosemiotic view of DNA as code, for example, implicates the 
semiotic and the presemiotic much more closely than is necessary in semiotic analysis of, 
for example, a film about the Second World War, where representation can be discussed 
on a quite different level from historical fact. Indeed, it is hard to describe what DNA 
represents; it simply is. In terms of the sign having two major roles, as prompt and as 
substitute, DNA clearly fulfils the former but not the latter. Biosemiotics per se calls into 
question the role of sign as substitutive representation at the same time as it calls into 
question anthropocentric conceptions of consciousness through its construals of umwelt 
and innenwelt (Uexküll, 1982).  
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 On other than a purely applied level, therefore, the role of sign as substitutive 
representation (as opposed to merely re-presentation, which is less problematic) is deeply 
problematic, and attempts to explain it run into difficulties accounting validly for the 
nature of the non-semiotic or pre-semiotic on which it supervenes. The most common 
resource to draw on here is Peirce’s triadism, whereby semiosis acts at the level of 
Thirdness, dependent on Firstness and Secondness. While this seems unproblematic as 
syllogistic generalisation (If Firstness plus Secondness infer Thirdness, then Thirdness 
implies Firstness plus Secondness), it becomes deeply problematic to explain in terms of 
concrete exemplification as what we know, we know at the level of Thirdness.ii A gap 
thus arises between logical schema and the capacity of semiotics to function analytically 
or critically. Koopman makes this objection to Peirce from the perspective of his 
transitionalist pragmatism, arguing that pragmatism is most powerfully manifested as 
engaged cultural critique, whereas Peirce shies from such critique (Koopman, 2009: 41-
44) while never fully abandoning the myth of the given in his dependence on Firstness 
and quality (: 78-100)iii. Given the shared commitments of pragmatism and semiotics to 
meaning as meaning-in-use, Koopman’s point is relevant to the present argument. 
However, Koopman considers only briefly the value of semiotics as a particular form of 
pragmatism that has the potential to escape entirely the mind-body/language-experience 
dualism that neopragmatists such as Sellars, Davidson, Brandom and Rorty (whom 
Koopman admires) can resolve only partially by rejecting the givenness of brute 
experience in classical empiricismiv. Semiotics can offer a rich, or thick empiricism 
which construes linguistic experience as no more or less real than sensory experience and 
thus avoids the perennial philosophical problem of having to justify valorizing one of 
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these over the other, as Koopman briefly suggests.v However, leading semiotic theorists, 
including Deely (1990) and Eco (1984), by retaining the category of presemiotic activity, 
have sidestepped rather than overcome this dichotomy. In this they follow Peirce who, 
although widely regarded as moving towards a pansemiotic position, in which semiotics 
accounts for much more than the progress of human reasoning, seems not to have 
abandoned his commitment to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness with its concomitant 
commitment to presemiotic activity. The triadic model thus offers logically more than it 
can deliver in terms of empirical verification. The strong realism to which it aspires is 
dependent on the classical empiricist myth of the given. 
 A common ground for the Peircean approach is to stress the desirability of a 
triadic over a dyadic conception of the sign (as in Saussure, 1974), as triadism somehow 
links ongoing sense making to, at the very least, previous sense making. The dyadic 
model, meanwhile, tends to be prone to an absolute form of thoroughgoing relativism in 
which the relationship of sign to not-sign (or even other sign) can only be dismissed as 
arbitrary. Such a position is, however (and ironically) more empirically verifiable than 
Peircean triadism: it is self-evident both that signifiers really exist and that they evoke a 
range of responses (i.e. that there is also evidence for the signified). However, it is self-
limiting in its scope. While Peirce may stand accused of impersonalising semiosis, 
Saussure might be accused of over-psychologising it by denying any framework for 
linking the purely anthroposemiotic to anything beyond it. Indeed, it might be argued that 
such a position goes beyond relativism altogether by undermining the criteria for relative 
judgment; that is, it offers no stronger grounds for explaining how semiosis proceeds than 
very thin conceptions such as Derrida’s trace (Derrida, 1978). In the case of Derridean 
A.Stables 6 
deconstruction, this goes beyond a simple (and easily justifiable) rejection of 
correspondence theories of truth by also rejecting coherentism. While an acceptance of 
meaning as always deferred is a useful corrective against mechanistic and atomistic 
approaches to, for example, learning theory, it runs the danger of encouraging the view 
that meaning-making and action are totally arbitrary and of no relevance to the extra-
human (indeed, perhaps of no clear relevance at all), and thus not valid even as partial 
expressions of the universal. Logically, therefore, human action, inter alia, might be 
entirely unpredictable and without consequences for the non-human, whereas it is, as 
observed and experienced, partly predictable and can have significant consequences for 
the non-human which, in turn, return to have consequences for the human (Derrida, 1976, 
1978; Stables, 2005: 67-71)  
 These problems of accounting for the presemiotic can be attributed to the legacy 
of substance metaphysics: that is, to the tradition, grounded in Aristotle’s conception of 
the unmoved mover, that the universe fundamentally comprises entities that interactvi. 
(Note that that modern physics’ continued employment of the concept ‘particle’ bears 
witness to this, even though a sub-atomic particle may be better understood as a burst of 
energy rather than a discrete material object.) On this account, presemiotic activity, at the 
body/(thin) experience level, both informs semiosis and grounds it in external reality, 
while the only feasible alternatives to this tend towards social constructionism, construing 
that external reality as figment of human semiosis. Both responses fail to integrate the 
subjective fully with the objective and pre-subjective and thus each diminishes the value 
of the subjective. Thus for both the strong Peircean and the structuralist, the sign is given 
a life irrespective of the sign user who is cast in the secondary role of commentator on 
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that which semiosis presents, which either does or does not give insight into external, 
physical reality. The alternative to this is a process account, within which I shall argue 
the sign can play a more central role that does not require attempts to justify substitutive 
representation. 
 
2. Substance vs. process: metaphysical contexts for defining the sign 
Substance metaphysics assumes the basic constitutents of the universe to be discrete, and 
usually material entities.vii Atomic theory, for example, is grounded in the assumption 
that the smallest entity is that of the constitutive atom; sub-atomic physics still adheres to 
substantive language in terming the constituents of the atom (a contradiction in terms to 
the Greek atomists) “particles”. Even Cartesian dualism is grounded in substance 
metaphysics, with Descartes arguing that mind and body were two different kinds of 
substance, one subject to extension and the other not. (Thus Cartesian mind body dualism 
is substantive and not merely schematic.) Traditionally, substances move in space, which 
is empty, and interact. Aristotle postulated, on this basis, that the role of physics was to 
understand the movement and interaction of substances and that behind all known 
substances must be an unmoved mover that imparts movement to all other substances 
(Bodnar, 2012). Despite its adherence in terms of some of the language of modern 
science, contemporary physicists have long abandoned the idea either that the universe 
began with inert mass or with entities on an other-than-physical level, or that space is 
empty. In relation to the latter, in very recent times, physicists have speculated that over 
90% of the universe may be dark matter or energy (note the substantive term employed 
here) of which we have no current understanding (NASA, 2014). Thus physics has 
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abandoned the basis of substance metaphysics largely though its language still resonates 
in terms such as “particles” and “matter”, certainly where these are taken as 
fundamentally constitutive rather than as effects.  
 On a process account, the cause-effect dynamic is reversed: substance is seen as 
the result of process and not vice-versa.  
 While process philosophers insist that all within and about reality is continuously 
going on and coming about, they do not deny that there are temporally stable and reliably 
recurrent aspects of reality. But they take such aspects of persistence to be the regular 
behavior of dynamic organizations that arise due to the continuously ongoing interaction 
of processes. In order to articulate a process view of reality, a special theoretical effort is 
required, however, since the standard theoretical tools of Western metaphysics are geared 
to the static view of reality (Seibt, 2012). 
 Here, the basic elements of the universe can be understood as energy or forces, 
but not as the discrete entities that are created by them, thus a realist ontology can be 
maintained but without belief in discrete noumenal entities. On an everyday level, this 
minimal ontological realism makes it much easier to accommodate relative hardness and 
softness, for example, or the boundaries between states of matter (solid, liquid, gas). 
Crucially to the present argument, there is no reason to regard the phenomenal sign as 
representative substitute for a noumenal object, nor as a discrete entity in its own right. 
(Note that although Kantian language is employed here, Kant had no grounds for 
assuming discrete objects to exist at the noumenal level: see Stables, 2014.) Nor is it 
necessary to see the sign as employed in relation to other signs by virtue of their qualities, 
dispositions or saliences (e.g. Pikkarainen, 2013) in order to understand the sign as 
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relational. At the same time, the sign is simultaneously real and subjective (I engage 
semiotically therefore I am). The sign can simply be regarded as a feature of an event, 
and personal experience as implication in an event, where a sequence of events defines a 
process, and “process” in the abstract indicates the sum of all processes, and thus of all 
events. As such the sign is inherently relational, as is a word in a sentence or a stem cell 
in a brain, heart or limb. It might be argued that for “feature” should be read “identifiable 
feature”, but this would be to fall back into the myth of the pre-semiotic given. 
“Identifiable” is implicit here, as an unidentified feature, although a logical possibility, is 
always empirically unverifiable.  
 The argument from process to sign is therefore as follows: 
(1) Process comprises processes; 
(2) Processes comprise events; 
(3) Events are known through experience;  
(4) Events are constituted by signs; 
(5) A sign is therefore a feature of an event. 
 
While (1), (2), (4) and (5) are unambiguous, the model rests on a particular understanding 
of (3) in two respects: 
(3i). In stating that events are known through experience, there is no implication that 
events exist separate from experience, and that human beings sometimes observe, sit in 
on, or make peripheral contributions to them. Such an explanation is necessary if and 
only if (3ii) ‘experience’ is construed either as brute sensory experience, as in (thin) 
empiricism, or as product of the human mind, as in anthroposemiotic idealism: i.e. as 
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language or some other form of symbolic representation. The present argument rests on 
accepting an event as a set of experiences, which by no means implies that my or our 
human experience is all there is to an event; however, as my experience is my implication 
in events, and as both the experiences and the events overlap and intersect with others, so 
my worldview is an insight into the real world, however strange it may seem to others. 
This insight is both valid and limited, as all knowledge is both constrained and made 
possible by context. 
 Note that on this account the sign retains its function as prompt but loses it as 
substitute. 
 This is a truly anti-Cartesian position insofar as if fails both to acknowledge a 
qualitative difference between that which is experienced (though not that which is 
experienced by a mere individual or group of persons) and between thinking human 
mind, motivated by reasons, and unthinking mechanical nature, motivated by causes. On 
the other hand, it retains a key element of Cartesian thinking which is lost in most 
modernist accounts: the centrality of the subjective. It is also truly anti-Aristotelian in 
denying the possibility of regression to a primary substance as cause: that is, whether 
there was anything before process or before an event in which something was implicated 
is an unanswerable question as process cannot be unthought. Our knowledge of an event 
remains incomplete insofar as the total universe comprises many events with many 
entities implicated in them, but this does not place an artificial division between event as 
experienced by “me” or “us” and the “real event”. Our experience is (no more or less 
than) our implication in events, and the fact that we attribute labels such as 
“consciousness” and “memory” to such experience does not constitute valid grounds for 
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objections such as that the present account only acknowledges the possibility of events 
witnessed by the human mind. To argue on the basis of this objection would be to create 
a straw man from the human descriptions of experiences of events that human beings 
have had. We do not know how it is to be implicated in events other than in the ways in 
which we have been implicated, but this does not preclude other sorts of implication.viii 
Furthermore, the experiences of those implicated in any particular event overlaps but 
does not coincide. (See Stables 2012 for further discussion of “overlapping phenomenal 
worlds”.) 
 It is this sense of overlapping that drives the educational considerations that 
comprise the remainder of this paper. 
 An event is that which is experienced, but it is experienced somewhat differently 
by each experiencing being. There is therefore no totality of an event nor of a process, 
nor of process itself other than the combined experience of experiencing agents which 
can never be the experience of one experiencing agent. The experiencing agent therefore 
construes the processes and therefore process. (The scientist understands cosmology, for 
example, as part of the community of scientists.) 
 The subjective, which is somewhat intersubjective, therefore trumps the objective. 
It is in the overlapping of subjectivities that help can be given, progress can be made, and 
love can be experienced. 
 
3. Implications for teaching and learning 
As will be clear from the argument so far, understanding teaching and learning in 
semiotic terms is not simply a matter of applying a form of semiotics to education. How 
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the sign is conceptualised is significant. If the sign is substitutive relation, then there is a 
relatively greater tendency to see teaching as a process of conveying objective truth. 
There is a relatively greater tendency to see understanding in either-or terms, as right or 
wrong, and the teacher-student relationship as one of expert-ignoramus, rather than as 
relatively more and less explorers on the revised model presented here.  
 Let us consider in more detail the process of learning. Traditional theories of 
learning, grounded in cognitivism and behavourism, are not required on the present 
perspective, as they rest on strong mind-body dualism. It is not a case of whether we 
learn by responding to stimuli or by changing our thought patterns. Depending on how 
these are construed, we learn by both of them.  Indeed, it can be argued that we learn all 
the time, inevitably, on the grounds that all living is semiotic engagement (Stables, 2006) 
and semiotic engagement produces inevitable change. On this view, “learning” becomes 
a value judgement on desirable change rather than a qualitatively distinct form of life. 
 Learning therefore is responding differently and/or making new meaning (which 
itself is a kind of response). It can be explained very simply as arising when habitual or 
conditioned responses (cd) encounter new contexts (cn) which result in unexpected 
outcomes (O) and therefore revision of habits: 
 
 0 = (cd+cn) 
 




This can be expanded to account for social and environmental change and progress (C/P) 
as: 
 C/P = (cd+cn)ⁿ 
 
Consider the particular example of a student encountering a word in a new context 
presented by the teacher. Say, the student knows the word ‘nuclear’ but has not been 
formerly introduced to the term “nuclear family”. In this case: 
 O = (cd [= nuclear cf. bomb/power] + cn [=nuclear [cf. small family])  
 
In other words, the student’s preconception of the meaning of “nuclear” will have been 
altered by the new encounter. This may or may not lead to conscious reflection on what 
“nuclear” really means, but it will prepare the student to encounter both meanings in the 
future. At first, however, the student may tend to have negative connotations of a 
“nuclear” family by virtue of simple association. 
 Subconsciously, when we encounter a word in a new context, we test whether our 
existing conceptions apply. Thus the denotations and connotations I have of the word 
“nuclear” do not necessarily change perceptively every time I hear the word. Rather, 
there are occasions on which the context renders it meaningless to carry on with my 
habitual responses to the term. As a learner, however, I will always try to make sense of 
the item in terms of my habitual responses. I may do this by making a judicious selection 
from them. Thus the model can be explained more fully as: 
 O = (cd+cn) where new interpretation (O) relies on sum of, or selection from, 
previous evocations (cd) in terms of what works in the present context (cn). 
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In some situations the newly encountered item may be completely unrecognizable: a new 
sign entirely. In this case, we may seek from our previous experiences the best analog we 
can. That is to say: understanding of new item (O) relies on strongest resonances of new 
item to known items (cd) and then selection or modification of one or more of those 
resonances to make best possible sense of new context (cn). 
 In Peircean terms, this is abductive. We cannot be sure what the new item is so we 
make the best guess possible at it. Unfortunately, educational systems tend to penalize 
students for doing this rather than praising them, even though it is inevitable. Students’ 
valid attempts to make sense of things are often rejected as error. 
 
4. Conclusion and implications 
Events are differentiated in terms of various kinds of recognition: for example, by shape, 
light and shade, and sound (some of which, in its evocation, we refer to as language). 
That is, events are known through semiotic engagement and the features of events are 
signs. This is an empirically and logically sound basis on which to proceed, uncluttered 
by the mythologies of either external qualia or internal mind. It offers a non-dualistix 
phenomenography in the spirit of transitionalist pragmatism (Koopman, 2009) 
uncluttered by the joint legacies of brute empiricism and linguisticism. That is, it does not 
require either discrete entities with inherent qualities or a view of language as anything 
more or less than sounds that evoke in combination. 
 To construe the sign as a feature of an event is to recognize the subjective as prior 
to the objective. However, this is no more anti-realist than Descartes’ subjective 
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rationalism (cogito ergo sum). Indeed, it is a subjective more-than-rationalism that 
recognizes the value of the subjective in all its aspects, from bodily functions to dreams, 
as the site of the real, insofar as the subjective comprises the individual’s implication in 
events, while the instersubjective (the overlapping of phenomenal worlds) comprises 
collective implication in events, and therefore understanding of what events are. Physics, 
chemistry, biology, geography, history and theology are all examples of such 
intersubjective understandings, and each can therefore be taken pragmatically as the best 
set of explanations available to a particular society at a particular time. 
Epistemologically, this implies that all such sets of understanding are open to revision 
(usually gradual rather than revolutionary) and ethically that all are worthy of respect, for 
to deny the value of an explanation is to deny the worth of a person’s experience, where 
“experience” incorporates language and the other mental activity on this non-dualist 
account. The future harmony of our multi-cultural world depends on this kind of realist 
relativism, which recognizes the subjective as both bigger than (in Kierkegaardian terms) 
and constitutive of the objective while simultaneously denying the givenness of brute 
experience and innate quality. 
 There are clear implications of this for education. (Education is singled out here to 
emphasise the becomingness of all personal and social being, whether or not it is 
consciously goal-directed.) As complete objective understanding is impossible but 
subjective experience is always valid, there is a case for shifting the emphasis in social 
and educational thinking from “believing in” (that is, commitment to absolute rights and 
wrongs) to “believing by” (that is, commitment to trying to make sense of our own and 
others’ actions, beliefs, experiences and worldviews), and concomitantly from 
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judgmentalism to judgment (that is, from an emphasis on telling others what to do to an 
emphasis on encouraging them to decide for themselves)x. In the teaching-and-learning 
situation, for example, the emphasis would then shift from teacher instruction in 
imparting correct understanding to replace the student’s current misunderstanding, to 
teacher facilitation of stimulating dialogue and other activity that encourage both students 
and teacher to clarify current beliefs and to revise them. There would still be 
acknowledgment of relative expertise, but free from the debilitating myths of complete 
knowledge and ignorance that currently accompany the roles of teacher and student. On 
this revised basis, teachers may well find their students much more willing to discuss and 
explore than is currently the case. All this is in line with the kind of transitionalist 
pragmatism offered by Koopman (2009), but incorporating the semiotic commitment to 
the included middle, and thus a complete rejection of the strong dualism of language and 
experience that haunts Koopman’s analysis, valuable though the latter is for undermining 
the latent givenness in construals of the sign by Peirce and his followers.  
 
NOTES 
1 ‘Biosemiotics encompasses all living systems from the cell, over bacteria, fungi, plants and animals to 
humans as sign producers and interpreters. Signs are the basic units for the study of life. Thus biosemiotics 
transcends the semiotic threshold between man and the rest of the world that Umberto Eco formulated. Of 
the two main paradigms in semiotics, Saussurian semiology and the Peircian semiotics, it is mostly Peircian 
semiotics that has been used to developed biosemiotics because it has a theory of signification of non-
intentional signs. Biosemiotics is already prefigured in Jakob von Uexküll's Umweltlehre , which Thomas 
Sebeok fruitfully used to found biosemiotics. Philosophical biologists in Copenhagen and Tartu have 
influenced the further development of biosemiotics. They see living systems from cells to humans defined 
by interactions between a digital code in the gene or genotype and an analogue in the whole individual or 
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phenotype. The gene is a code for memory and self-representation the individual living body is a code for 
action and interaction with the real world and its ecology. Thus life appears to be a communicative 
interplay of different types of self- and other- descriptions carried by molecules.’ (Brier, S., undated) 
2 Some commentators find this exasperating: ‘Merely to say that Peirce was extremely fond of placing 
things into groups of three, of trichotomies, and of triadic relations, would fail miserably to do justice to the 
overwhelming obtrusiveness in his philosophy of the number three. Indeed, he made the most fundamental 
categories of all “things” of any sort whatsoever the categories of “Firstness,” “Secondness,” and 
“Thirdness,” and he often described “things” as being “firsts” or “seconds” or “thirds.” For example, with 
regard to the trichotomy “possibility,” “actuality,” and “necessity,” possibility he called a first, actuality he 
called a second, and necessity he called a third. Again: quality was a first, fact was a second, and habit (or 
rule or law) was a third. Again: entity was a first, relation was a second, and representation was a third. 
Again: rheme (by which Peirce meant a relation of arbitrary adicity or arity) was a first, proposition was a 
second, and argument was a third. The list goes on and on. Let us refer to Peirce's penchant for describing 
things in terms of trichotomies and triadic relations as Peirce's “triadism.” 
If Peirce had a general rationale for his triadism, Peirce scholars have not yet made it abundantly clear what 
this rationale might be. He seemed to base his triadism on what he called “phaneroscopy,” by which word 
he meant the mere observation of phenomenal appearances. He regularly commented that the phenomena 
just do fall into three groups and that they just do display irreducibly triadic relations.  (Burch, 2010: $9) 
3 ‘Throughout Peirce’s writings, we find endorsements of givenism in varying strengths implicit in his 
varying conceptions of  Quality or firstness.’ (Koopman, 2009: 81). However, in opting for the 
neopragmatist approaches of Rorty, Brandom and (unusually in this company) Bourdieu, Koopman is 
acknowledging, to some extent at least, the enduring value of the language vs. experience divide. 
4 Koopman, 2009: 124: ‘If the linguistic turn amounts to repudiating foundationalism by insisting on the 
irreducible linguisticality of all experience, , then the semiotic turn attempts to repudiate foundationalism 
by more modestly insisting on the irreducible meaningfulness of all experience.’ 
- and 126: ‘One fresh suggestion [N.B. not ascribed by Koopman] involves redescribing the relation 
between experience and language….The view here is that language is just a kind of experience.’ 
(italics in original) 
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5See Stables, 2013, for a somewhat fuller account of the weaknesses of both idealism and classical 
empiricism in this respect, and thus the argument for a thick or rich empiricism that resolves the dichotomy. 
6 Substances are unique in being independent things; the items in the other categories all depend somehow 
on substances. That is, qualities are the qualities of substances; quantities are the amounts and sizes that 
substances come in; relations are the way substances stand to one another. These various non-substances all 
owe their existence to substances—each of them, as Aristotle puts it, exists only ‘in’ a subject. That is, each 
non-substance “is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in” (Cat. 1a25). 
Indeed, it becomes clear that substances are the subjects that these ontologically dependent non-substances 
are ‘in’. (Cohen, 2012, $2)  
   Each member of a non-substance category thus stands in this inherence relation (as it is frequently called) 
to some substance or other—color is always found in bodies, knowledge in the soul. Neither whiteness nor 
a piece of grammatical knowledge, for example, is capable of existing on its own. Each requires for its 
existence that there be some substance in which it inheres.  
7 Note that this assumption that the originary substances were physical material beings as we understand 
them cannot be directly inferred from Aristotle. See Bodnar, 2012, for a more extended summary of 
Aristotle’s thinking in this area. 
8 cf. Nagel, 1974. 
9- in the sense of mind-body substance dualism. 
10 Consider, for example, the strife that could be avoided if the universal emphasis in religious debate were 
not on defence of a committed position bur rather exploration of what we, and others, mean by their 




Bodnar, 1stván.  2012. Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy, in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/ 15 January 2014 
A.Stables 19 
Brier, Søren S. Undated) Biosemiotics 
www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/brier/biosemiotics.doc, 10 January 2014 
Burch, Robert. 2010. Charles Sanders Peirce, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/peirce-semiotics/, 22 November 2011 
Cohen, S.Marc. 2012. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/, 15 January 2014 
Deely, John. 1990. Basics of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Derrida, Jacques. 1976. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: John Hopkins. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1978. Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Eco, Umberto. 1984. Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Koopman, Colin. 2009. Pragmatism as Transition. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Nagel, Thomas. (1974) What is it Like to be a Bat? Philosophical Review 4, pp.435-450 
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, US) 2014. Dark Energy and 
Dark Matter. http://science.nasa.gov/astrophysics/focus-areas/what-is-dark-energy/ 16 
January 2014 
Peirce, Charles Sanders. 2000. Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a chronological edition (ed. 
Houser, N. et al), Vol. 6. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Pikkarainen, Eetu. 2013. From the Ontology of Interaction to the Semiotics of Education, 
in Tirri, K. and Kuusisto, E. (eds.) Interaction in Educational Domains. Rotterdam: 
Sense, pp. 51-61 
A.Stables 20 
Saussure, Ferdinand. de 1974. Course in General Liguistics (Bally, C. and Sechehaye, A. 
eds.; Baskin, W. trans.). London: Fontana 
Seibt, Johanna. 2012. Process Philosophy, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/ 10 January 2014 
Stables, Andrew. 2006. Living and Learning as Semiotic Engagement. New York: 
Mellen. 
Stables, Andrew. 2012. Be(com)ing Human: Semiosis and the Myth of Reason. 
Rotterdam: Sense. 
Stables, Andrew. 2013. Semiotics as a Philosophy for Education: from concepts to signs, 
in Tirri, K. and Kuusisto, E. (eds.) Interaction in Educational Domains. Rotterdam: 
Sense, pp.37-49 
Stables, Andrew. 2014. Peirce and Rationalism: Is Peirce a Fully Semiotic Philosopher? 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 48/4, 591-603. 
Uexküll, Jakob von  1982. The Theory of Meaning. Semiotica 42(1), 25-82 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
